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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on appeals 
by defendant-appellant New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") and intervenor- 
appellant St. Lawrence Cement Co., L.L.C. ("St. Lawrence") 
from the district court's order granting preliminary 
injunctive relief to plaintiffs, South Camden Citizens in 
Action and ten residents of the Waterfront South 
neighborhood of Camden, New Jersey. Plaintiffs brought 
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, as well as on 
other bases, claiming NJDEP discriminated against them by 
issuing an air permit to St. Lawrence to operate a facility 
that would have an adverse disparate racial impact upon 
them in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. SS 2000d to 2000d-7. 
 
Our opinion focuses on whether, following the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 
275, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (2001), plaintiffs can maintain this 
action under section 1983 for disparate impact 
discrimination in violation of Title VI and its implementing 
regulations. For the reasons we set forth, we hold that an 
administrative regulation cannot create an interest 
enforceable under section 1983 unless the interest already 
is implicit in the statute authorizing the regulation, and 
that inasmuch as Title VI proscribes only intentional 
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discrimination, the plaintiffs do not have a right enforceable 
through a 1983 action under the EPA's disparate impact 
discrimination regulations. Because the district court 
predicated its order granting injunctive relief on section 
1983, we will reverse. 
 




As we ultimately decide this appeal on a legal basis and 
the district court's opinions stated the facts at length, we 
only need summarize the factual background of this case. 
Initially, we point out that the residents of Waterfront 
South are predominately minorities and the neighborhood 
is disadvantaged environmentally.1 Waterfront South 
contains two Superfund sites, several contaminated and 
abandoned industrial sites, and many currently operating 
facilities, including chemical companies, waste facilities, 
food processing companies, automotive shops, and a 
petroleum coke transfer station. Moreover, NJDEP has 
granted permits for operation of a regional sewage 
treatment plant, a trash-to-steam incinerator and a co- 
generation power plant in the neighborhood. As a result, 
Waterfront South, though only one of 23 Camden 
neighborhoods, hosts 20% of the city's contaminated sites 
and, on average, has more than twice the number of 
facilities with permits to emit air pollution than exist in the 
area encompassed within a typical New Jersey zip code. 
 
St. Lawrence supplies cement materials, primarily to the 
ready-mix concrete industry. One aspect of St. Lawrence's 
business is the processing of ground granulated blast 
furnace slag ("GBFS"), a sand-like by-product of the steel- 
making industry, used in portland cement. In 1998, St. 
Lawrence wanted to open a GBFS grinding facility on a site 
in Camden owned by the South Jersey Port Corporation 
(the "Port"). In furtherance of this project, in March 1999 
St. Lawrence signed a lease with the Port for the site and 
initiated discussions with NJDEP with respect to obtaining 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Waterfront South community is comprised of 63% African- 
American, 28.3% Hispanic, and 9% white residents. 
 
                                10 
 
 
construction and operation permits for the facility, 
primarily focusing on the air permit that required 
minimizing the emission of PM10, i.e., particulate matter 
with a diameter of 10 microns or less. NJDEP required St. 
Lawrence to conduct an air quality impact analysis for 
PM10 confirming that there would not be adverse health 
impacts from operation of the facility and that St. 
Lawrence's operations complied with the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards for PM10. St. Lawrence completed 
the analysis, and NJDEP accepted the result that the 
facility's emissions would satisfy the established standards 
applicable to its operation. 
 
On November 1, 1999, NJDEP notified St. Lawrence that 
the permit process was "administratively complete." 
Accordingly, NJDEP permitted St. Lawrence to begin 
construction of the facility, which it did in late 1999. Then, 
on July 25, 2000, NJDEP gave notice of a public hearing to 
be held on August 23, 2000, addressing St. Lawrence's 
draft air permit. NJDEP stated, however, that it would 
accept written comments on the draft permit until August 
31, 2000. Approximately 120 community members voiced 
their opinions and concerns about St. Lawrence's facility at 
the hearing, and several individuals provided NJDEP with 
written comments. 
 
Thereafter, NJDEP issued a 33-page "Hearing Officer's 
Report Responses to Public Comments on the Draft Air 
Permit" for St. Lawrence. In the report, NJDEP addressed 
the concerns raised by community members, including 
environmental equity/environmental justice, preexisting 
local environmental issues, St. Lawrence's emission limits, 
the results of St. Lawrence's air quality impact analysis, 
truck emission standards and carbon monoxide air quality 
evaluation results, and the protection of the health and 
safety of Waterfront South residents. Plaintiffs, however, 
filed an administrative complaint with the EPA and a 
request for a grievance hearing with NJDEP, as they alleged 
that NJDEP's permit review procedures violated Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the procedures did not 
include an analysis of the allegedly racially disparate 
adverse impact of the facility. NJDEP did not respond to the 
grievance hearing request, and on October 31, 2000, issued 
St. Lawrence's final air permit. 
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B. Procedural History 
 
On February 13, 2001, plaintiffs filed a complaint against 
NJDEP and NJDEP Commissioner Robert C. Shinn, Jr., 
alleging that they violated Title VI by intentionally 
discriminating against them in violation of section 601, 42 
U.S.C. S 2000d, by issuing the air quality permit and 
further asserting that the facility in operation under the air 
permit would have an adverse disparate impact on them in 
violation of section 602, 42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1. St. Lawrence 
subsequently intervened with the consent of the parties. 
Following the submission of briefs and expert reports and 
oral argument, the district court issued an opinion and 
order on April 19, 2001, granting plaintiffs' request for a 
preliminary injunction. See South Camden Citizens in Action 
v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 505 
(D.N.J. 2001) ("South Camden I"). In reaching its 
conclusions, the court found that section 602 and its 
implementing regulations contained an implied private right 
of action. Therefore, inasmuch as the court found that 
plaintiffs otherwise were entitled to relief based on their 
disparate impact claim, it remanded the matter to NJDEP 
for a Title VI analysis. See id. at 473-84, 505. 
 
South Camden I, however, had a short shelf life. On April 
24, 2001, the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, holding that 
"[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does 
Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private 
right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under 
S 602. We therefore hold that no such right of action 
exists." Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1523 (footnote omitted). 
Obviously, Sandoval eliminated the basis for the court's 
injunction in South Camden I, an effect that led St. 
Lawrence to move to dissolve the injunction. The district 
court, however, denied the motion, following which St. 
Lawrence again sought similar relief or a stay of the 
injunction pending appeal. The district court then allowed 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a claim to 
enforce section 602 through section 1983. The court also 
required supplemental briefing on plaintiffs' remaining 
claims, namely, whether plaintiffs' intentional 
discrimination charge and/or their section 1983 claim 
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could provide an alternate basis for relief. On May 10, 
2001, the court issued a supplemental opinion and order 
continuing the preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' 
section 1983 claim and again remanding the matter to 
NJDEP for a Title VI analysis. See South Camden Citizens 
in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 
(D.N.J. 2001) (South Camden II). In reaching its result the 
court relied, inter alia, on Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 
403 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046, 120 S.Ct. 579 
(1999), in which we held that there was a private right of 
action available to enforce a regulation implementing Title 
VI and that a disparate impact discrimination claim could 
be maintained under section 1983 for a violation of a 
regulation promulgated pursuant to section 602. See South 
Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 520, 525, 543. Immediately 
thereafter, St. Lawrence unsuccessfully moved in the 
district court for a stay of the preliminary injunction 
pending appeal. 
 
St. Lawrence appealed to this court, and on May 15, 
2001, filed with us a motion to suspend or, in the 
alternative, to modify the preliminary injunction pending 
appeal, as well as a request for expedited review of the 
appeal. On May 29, 2001, NJDEP requested a stay of the 
remand process from the district court, but on June 4, 
2001, the district court denied that request. NJDEP then 
made the same application to this court on June 6, 2001, 
but we denied its motion on June 11, 2001. On June 12, 
2001, however, we granted St. Lawrence's request for 
expedited review, and on June 15, 2001, we granted St. 





As we have indicated, plaintiffs in their amended 
complaint sought an injunction under section 1983 
preventing operation of St. Lawrence's GBFS grinding  
facility.2 The district court found that plaintiffs stated a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1). 
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claim under section 1983 against NJDEP for violating 
section 602 and its implementing regulations by failing to 
consider the potentially adverse discriminatory impact of 
permitting operation of the facility, and therefore enjoined 
its operation until NJDEP made such a determination. 3 We 
review the district court's order granting a preliminary 
injunction for abuse of discretion, although we review 
factual findings for clear error and questions of law de 
novo. See AT&T v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 
F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We often have recognized that injunctive relief, 
particularly preliminary relief, is an "extraordinary remedy 
. . . which should be granted only in limited 
circumstances." Id. (citation omitted). To obtain a 
preliminary injunction, the moving party must 
demonstrate: (1) the reasonable probability of eventual 
success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be irreparably 
injured if relief is not granted. Moreover, the district court 
also should take into account, when relevant, (3) the 
possibility of harm to other interested persons from the 
grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest. 
See In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 
1143 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, "a failure to show a likelihood of 
success or a failure to demonstrate irreparable injury must 
necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction." 
Id. at 1143. 
 
We first consider the probability of plaintiffs' success in 
the litigation and, indeed, as we find that their case is 
legally insufficient, we will go no further. Naturally, in view 
of Sandoval, the overarching legal issue on this appeal is 
whether plaintiffs can advance a cause of action to enforce 
section 602 of Title VI and its implementing regulations 
through section 1983. If they cannot, then the only basis 
on which they can obtain relief is to demonstrate that the 
NJDEP engaged in intentional discrimination, a possibility 
that we do not address on this appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The parties agree that the NJDEP receives grants of federal financial 
assistance so as to be subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 
including sections 601 and 602. 
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We start our legal analysis with a consideration of 
Sandoval in which the Court held that a private right of 
action is not available to enforce disparate impact 
regulations promulgated under Title VI,4  thus overruling 
Powell at least to the extent that it held to the contrary. See 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at ___, 121 S. Ct. at 1523. In Sandoval, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We have set forth conditions that can lead to the recognition of a 
private right of action not explicitly created as follows: 
 
       When a statute does not explicitly supply a private right of 
action, 
       two occasionally intersecting avenues may be explored for a 
possible 
       private right of enforcement. First, an implied private right of 
action 
       to enforce the statute may exist directly under the statute in 
       accordance with the four-factor analysis of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66, 
       78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088 (1975). To establish an implied private 
right 
       of action under Cort v. Ash, the plaintiff must satisfy the first 
       requirement--that the statute creates a federal right in favor of 
the 
       plaintiff. The plaintiff must then satisfy the three remaining Cort 
v. 
       Ash requirements relating to the existence of a remedy--that 
       Congress intended to create a remedy, that the remedy is consistent 
       with the legislative scheme, and that the cause of action is not 
       traditionally relegated to state law. In sum, under Cort v. Ash the 
       plaintiff bears the burden of establishing not only the existence 
of a 
       right, but also the existence of an intended private remedy. 
 
        In appropriate cases, the second avenue for private enforcement of 
       a federal statute is S 1983. In determining whether a private right 
of 
       action exists under S 1983, only two inquiries are relevant: one, 
       whether the statute alleged to have been violated creates a federal 
       right in favor of the plaintiff, and the other, whether Congress 
has 
       foreclosed the remedy of private enforcement. TheS 1983 analysis 
       intersects with the Cort v. Ash analysis insofar as the plaintiff 
under 
       both analyses must establish the creation of a federal right. With 
       respect to the existence of a remedy, however, the contrast between 
       the two analyses is stark. Under Cort v. Ash the plaintiff must 
       establish that Congress intended the remedy. UnderS 1983 
       analysis, on the other hand, once a federal right is established, 
the 
       existence of a remedy is presumed because S 1983 itself provides 
the 
       authorization for private enforcement. The burden is on the 
       defendant to establish that Congress intended to foreclose private 
       enforcement. 
 
W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989). In 
Sandoval, the Court focused exclusively on whether Congress had 
created a federal right in favor of the plaintiff, the same essential 
question at issue here. 
 
                                15 
 
 
the Court considered a challenge to the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety's official policy of administering 
its driver's license examination only in English as violative 
of Title VI and its implementing regulations. See id. at ___, 
121 S.Ct. at 1515. The Court held that "[n]either as 
originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI 
display an intent to create a freestanding private right of 
action to enforce regulations promulgated underS 602. We 
therefore hold that no such right of action exists." Id. at 
___, 121 S.Ct. at 1523. *In reaching its result in Sandoval, 
the Court began by listing three aspects of Title VI that 
"must be taken as given": (1) private individuals may sue to 
enforce section 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive 
relief and damages; (2) section 601 prohibits only 
intentional discrimination; and (3) for the purposes of the 
case, regulations promulgated pursuant to section 602 
validly may proscribe disparate impact discrimination even 
though it is permissible under section 601. See id. at ___, 
121 S.Ct. at 1516-17. Then, the Court considered whether 
section 602 regulations conferred a private right of action, 
looking to its precedent interpreting Title VI and to the text 
and structure of Title VI. See id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1519. 
First, the Court noted, based on its analysis of its holdings 
in its prior Title VI cases, that it previously had not held 
that there is such a private right of action under section 
602. See id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1517-21 (citing Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786 (1974) (holding that 
section 601 prohibits disparate impact discrimination); 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694, 99 S.Ct. 
1946, 1956 (1979) (holding that private right of action 
exists to enforce Title IX, which is patterned after Title VI); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287, 98 
S.Ct. 2733, 2746 (1978) (holding, contrary to Lau, that 
section 601 proscribes only those classifications that would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
namely intentional discrimination); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983) 
(affirming Bakke's holding that section 601 prohibits only 
intentional discrimination); Alexander v. Choate , 469 U.S. 
287, 293, 105 S.Ct. 712, 716 (1985) (same)). 
 
The Court then found that section 602's text and 
structure did not evince an intent to create a private right 
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of action and that the regulations alone were insufficient to 
create a private right of action. See id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 
1520-22 ("Language in a regulation may invoke a private 
right of action that Congress through statutory text created, 
but it may not create a right that Congress has not."). 
Therefore, the Court held that a private right of action was 
not available to enforce regulations promulgated under 
section 602. See id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1523. However, 
inasmuch as the plaintiffs in Sandoval did not advance a 
cause of action under section 1983 to enforce Title VI and 
its implementing regulations, the majority did not consider 
whether such an action is available.5 
 
Resolution of this issue, therefore, requires us to examine 
whether disparate impact regulations promulgated 
pursuant to section 602 may, and if so do, create a right 
that may be enforced through a section 1983 action. 
 
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part: 
 
       Every person who, under color of any statute, 
       ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
       or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
       causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
       or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
       deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
       secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated the following with regard to 
section 1983: 
 
       [T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents 
       merely because they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C.S 1983 in 
       framing their Title VI claim, this case is something of a sport. 
       Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI 
regulations 
       against state actors in all likelihood must only reference S 1983 
to 
       obtain relief; indeed, the plaintiffs in this case (or other 
similarly 
       situated individuals) presumably retain the option of re-
challenging 
       Alabama's English-only policy in a complaint that invokes S 1983 
       even after today's decision. 
 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1527 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
The majority does not address the dissent's statement. Nevertheless, for 
the reasons that follow, we conclude that the majority's opinion and 
Supreme Court precedent do not permit the bringing of the section 1983 
action that Justice Stevens suggested is available. 
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       the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or 
       other proper proceeding for redress. 
 
Therefore, section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation 
under color of state law of "any rights . . . secured by the 
Constitution and laws." In Maine v. Thiboutot , 448 U.S. 1, 
6-8, 100 S.Ct. 2504, 2505-06 (1980), the Supreme Court 
interpreted this language and held that causes of action 
under section 1983 are not limited to claims based on 
constitutional or equal rights violations. Rather, certain 
rights created under federal statutes are enforceable 
through section 1983 as well. This rule, however, is limited 
by two well-recognized exceptions. First, a section 1983 
remedy is not available "where Congress has foreclosed 
such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself." 
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 
479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770 (1987). Second, the 
remedy is not available "where the statute did not create 
enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the 
meaning of S 1983." Id. 
 
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test to 
determine whether a federal statute creates an individual 
right enforceable through a section 1983 action: 
 
       First, Congress must have intended that the provision 
       in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff 
       must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected 
       by the statute is not so `vague and amorphous' that its 
       enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, 
       the statute must unambiguously impose a binding 
       obligation on the States. In other words, the provision 
       giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in 
       mandatory, rather than precatory, terms. 
 
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 
1353, 1359-60 (1997). If a plaintiff satisfies each of these 
elements, and therefore establishes and identifies a federal 
right that allegedly has been violated, a rebuttable 
presumption that the right is enforceable through 
section 1983 arises. See id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. at 1360; see 
also Banks v. Dallas Housing Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 2001 WL 
1285391, at *4 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2001). We have found two 
circumstances, which in harmony with Wright, are 
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sufficient to rebut this presumption: where "Congress 
specifically foreclosed a remedy under S 1983,[either] 
expressly, by forbidding recourse to S 1983 in the statute 
itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive 
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual 
enforcement under S 1983." Powell, 189 F.3d at 401 
(citations omitted). In the former case, the plaintiff 's claim 
must fail. In the latter case, however, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to "make the difficult showing that allowing 
a S 1983 action to go forward in these circumstances `would 
be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme.' " 
Id. (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. at 1362). 
 
Here, plaintiffs seek to enforce a prohibition on disparate 
impact discrimination that does not appear explicitly in 
Title VI, but rather is set forth in EPA regulations. They 
contend that the regulations are a valid interpretation of 
Title VI.6 Section 601 of Title VI provides: 
 
       No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
       race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
       participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
       subjected to discrimination under any program or 
       activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000d. Section 602 provides, in relevant part: 
 
       Each Federal department and agency which is 
       empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to 
       any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or 
       contract other than a contract of insurance or 
       guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the 
       provisions of section 2000d [Section 601] of this title 
       with respect to such program or activity by issuing 
       rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability 
       which shall be consistent with achievement of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We assume without deciding that the regulations are valid, as neither 
NJDEP nor St. Lawrence timely challenged them in the district court and 
our analysis does not turn on their validity. That being said, like the 
Court stated in Sandoval, we observe that there does seem to be 
considerable tension between the section 602 regulations proscribing 
activities that have a disparate impact and section 601's limitation to 
interdiction only of intentionally discriminatory activities. See 
Sandoval, 
532 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1517. 
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       objectives of the statute authorizing financial 
       assistance in connection with which the action is 
       taken. 
 
Id. S 2000d-1. Finally, the EPA regulations at issue provide: 
 
       No person shall be excluded from participation in, 
       be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
       discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
       EPA assistance on the basis of race, color, [or] national 
       origin . . . . 
 
       . . . 
 
        A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of 
       administering its program which have the effect of 
       subjecting individuals to discrimination because of 
       their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the 
       effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
       accomplishment of the objectives of the program with 
       respect to individuals of a particular race, color, 
       national origin, or sex. 
 
40 C.F.R. SS 7.30 & 7.35(b). According to plaintiffs, these 
statutory provisions and their complementary regulations 
prohibiting discriminatory impacts in administering 
programs create a federal right enforceable through section 
1983. 
 
This contention raises the question of whether a 
regulation can create a right enforceable through section 
1983 where the alleged right does not appear explicitly in 
the statute, but only appears in the regulation. The district 
court found that the Supreme Court, as well as this court, 
have found that a regulation may create an enforceable 
right, see South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27 
(citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 418, 107 S.Ct. at 766; W. Va. 
Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1984)), and 
therefore concluded that the three-prong Blessing test 
applied to determine whether the EPA regulations indeed 
created a federal right. See id. at 529. For the reasons that 
follow, however, we are satisfied that the district court's 
conclusion was erroneous. Thus, as the plaintiffs do not 
advance any federal right to enforce, the district court erred 
in granting relief on the basis of section 1983. 
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In considering whether a regulation in itself can establish 
a right enforceable under section 1983, we initially point 
out that a majority of the Supreme Court never has stated 
expressly that a valid regulation can create such a right. In 
Guardians Ass'n Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Blackmun, wrote: "[I]t is clear that the S 1983 
remedy is intended to redress the deprivation of rights 
secured by all valid federal laws, including statutes and 
regulations having the force of law." See Guardians Ass'n, 
463 U.S. at 638, 103 S.Ct. at 3251. According to them, the 
rationale of Thiboutot applied equally to statutes and 
administrative regulations having the force of law. See id. at 
638 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 3251 n.6. But later in Wright, four 
Justices expressed the contrary view. See Wright , 479 U.S. 
at 437-38, 107 S.Ct. at 777-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia, wrote in dissent: 
 
       In the absence of any indication in the language, 
       legislative history, or administrative interpretation of 
       the Brooke Amendment that Congress intended to 
       create an enforceable right to utilities, it is necessary to 
       ask whether administrative regulations alone could 
       create such a right. This is a troubling issue not 
       briefed by the parties, and I do not attempt to resolve 
       it here. The Court's questionable reasoning that, 
       because for four years HUD gave somewhat less 
       discretion to the PHA's in setting reasonable utilities 
       allowances, HUD understood Congress to have required 
       enforceable utility standards, apparently allows it to 
       sidestep the question. I am concerned, however, that 
       lurking behind the Court's analysis may be the view 
       that, once it has been found that a statute creates 
       some enforceable right, any regulation adopted within 
       the purview of the statute creates rights enforceable in 
       federal courts, regardless of whether Congress or the 
       promulgating agency ever contemplated such a result. 
       Thus, HUD's frequently changing views on how best to 
       administer the provision of utilities to public housing 
       tenants becomes the focal point for the creation and 
       extinguishment of federal `rights.' Such a result, where 
       determination of S 1983 `rights' has been unleashed 
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       from any connection to congressional intent, is 




Notwithstanding the foregoing cautionary language, the 
district court relied on Wright in holding that federal 
regulations may create rights enforceable through section 
1983. In Wright, the plaintiffs alleged the housing authority 
violated a federal statute imposing a rent ceiling and the 
statute's implementing regulations which required public 
housing authorities to include a reasonable utility 
allowance in tenants' rent. See id. at 419, 107 S.Ct. at 768. 
The defendants argued that neither the statute nor the 
regulations gave the tenants a right enforceable through 
section 1983. See id. at 429-30, 107 S.Ct. at 773. In 
response, the Court stated: 
 
       We perceive little substance in this claim. The Brooke 
       Amendment could not be clearer: as further amended 
       in 1981, tenants could be charged as rent no more and 
       no less than 30 percent of their income. This was a 
       mandatory limitation focusing on the individual family 
       and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is 
       undeniable. Nor is there any question that HUD 
       interim regulations, in effect when this suit began, 
       expressly required that a `reasonable' amount for 
       utilities be included in rent that a PHA was allowed to 
       charge, an interpretation to which HUD has adhered 
       both before and after the adoption of the Brooke 
       Amendment. HUD's view is entitled to deference as a 
       valid interpretation of the statute, and Congress in the 
       course of amending that provision, has not disagreed 
       with it. 
 
        Respondent nevertheless asserts that the provision 
       for a `reasonable' allowance for utilities is too vague 
       and amorphous to confer on tenants an enforceable 
       `right' within the meaning of S 1983 and that the whole 
       matter of utility allowances must be left to the 
       discretion of the PHA, subject to supervision by HUD. 
       The regulations, however, defining the statutory 
       concept of `rent' as including utilities, have the force of 
       law . . ., they specifically set out guidelines that the 
 
                                22 
 
 
       PHAs were to follow in establishing utility allowances, 
       and they require notice to tenants and an opportunity 
       to comment on proposed allowances. In our view, the 
       benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are 
       sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as 
       enforceable rights under Pennhurst [State School & 
       Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531 
       (1981)] and S 1983, rights that are not, as respondent 
       suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to 
       enforce. 
 
Id. at 430-32, 107 S.Ct. at 773-75 (footnotes omitted).7 
 
As we have indicated, the district court held, and the 
appellees argue here, that Wright stands for the proposition 
that valid federal regulations may create rights enforceable 
under section 1983, to which the Blessing analysis applies. 
Therefore, the appellees argue that because the EPA's 
section 602 regulations are valid and enforceable, we 
should apply the Blessing analysis and conclude that the 
regulations create rights enforceable through section 1983. 
 
The district court's holding was, however, erroneous 
because, as the foregoing quotation from the Court's 
opinion makes clear, Wright dealt with an issue that differs 
from that presented in the district court and here. There, 
the Court, in finding the statute and its implementing 
regulations created a right enforceable through section 
1983, focused on tying the right to a reasonable utility 
allowance to Congress' intent to create federal rights 
through the statute. The Court looked first to the statutory 
provision creating the ceiling on tenants' rent, describing it 
as "a mandatory limitation focusing on the individual family 
and its income." Id. at 430, 107 S.Ct. at 773-74. Further, 
it stated that Congress' intent with regard to the statute to 
benefit tenants was "undeniable." Id. at 430, 107 S.Ct. at 
774. Having reached this conclusion, it turned to the 
regulations and found that they were entitled to deference 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently in Banks v. Dallas 
Housing Authority, 271 F.3d 605, 2001 WL 1285391, at *4, indicated 
that a statutory obligation in 42 U.S.C. S 1437f(e) (repealed) to provide 
"decent, safe, and sanitary" housing was too vague to be judicially 
enforceable under section 1983, distinguishing Wright. 
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as valid administrative interpretations of the statute. Id., 
107 S.Ct. at 774. It afforded this deference, however, after 
having found that Congress had conferred upon plaintiffs 
that right by statute. Id., 107 S.Ct. at 773. 
 
Clearly, therefore, the regulation at issue in Wright 
merely defined the specific right that Congress already had 
conferred through the statute. See id. at 430 n.11 & 431, 
107 S.Ct. at 774 & n.11 (rejecting "respondent's argument 
that the Brooke Amendment's rent ceiling applies only to 
the charge for shelter and that the HUD definition of rent 
as including a reasonable charge for utilities is not 
authorized by the statute" and stating regulations "defin[ed] 
the statutory concept of `rent' "). There should be no doubt 
on this point, for the Court plainly stated that"the benefits 
Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently 
specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under 
Pennhurst and S 1983, rights that are not, as respondent 
suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to 
enforce." Id. at 432, 107 S.Ct. at 774-75 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the Wright Court located the alleged right in the 
statutory provision and then relied upon the implementing 
regulations to define and interpret that right. Critically, as 
pertains to this case, Wright does not hold that a regulation 
alone--i.e., where the alleged right does not appear 
explicitly in the statute, but only appears in the regulation 
--may create an enforceable federal right. It is thus 
manifest that, inasmuch as the disparate impact 
regulations go far beyond the intentional discrimination 
interdiction in section 601, the district court's reliance on 
Wright was misplaced. 
 
Similarly, although also relied upon by the district court, 
none of our opinions in Alexander, Casey , or Powell nor 
that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Buckley 
v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188 (9th Cir. 1995), justifies the 
district court's conclusion that valid regulations may create 
rights enforceable under section 1983. In Alexander, we 
held that federal regulations governing the administration 
of the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and 
Children created rights enforceable under section 1983 for 
recipients of program assistance. See Alexander , 750 F.2d 
at 261. But the right enforceable through section 1983, 
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namely notice of the right to a fair hearing upon 
termination of benefits, could be traced to and was 
consistent with the statute as it provided for cash grants to 
local agencies to enable them to carry out health and 
nutrition programs to make supplemental food available to 
pregnant and lactating women and infants. Accordingly, the 
statute created a right to supplemental food for those who 
qualified. See id. at 253 & n.3. 
 
We recognize that in Alexander we never expressly 
identified the right as stemming from the statute. 
Nevertheless we did not expressly analyze the question of 
whether a federal regulation could create an enforceable 
section 1983 right. Instead, after stating the general rule 
that violations of federal statutes may be actionable under 
section 1983 except where Congress has foreclosed section 
1983 enforcement or the statute does not create 
enforceable rights, we simply concluded that the regulation 
created an enforceable right. See id. at 259. 
 
But Alexander did not involve a circumstance in which 
the regulations attempted to create a federal right beyond 
any that Congress intended to create in enacting the 
statute. Furthermore, we decided Alexander in 1984, well 
before the Supreme Court refined its analysis to focus 
directly on Congress' intent to create enforceable rights and 
to confine its holdings to the limits of that intent. See 
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. at 1360-61 
(concentrating on Congress' intent to create rights in 
statute enforceable through section 1983); Suter v. Artist M., 
503 U.S. 347, 357, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1367 (1992) (same); 
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 510, 110 S.Ct. 
2510, 2517-18 (1990) (same); Golden State Transit Corp. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110-11, 110 S.Ct. 444, 
451 (1989) (same); Wright, 479 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. at 
774 (focusing on Congress' intent to create rights in 
statute enforceable through section 1983, and finding 
implementing regulation defined right). Therefore, 
Alexander is distinguishable from this case. 
 
So, too, is Casey. There, we stated, citing only Wright and 
Alexander, that "valid federal regulations as well as federal 
statutes may create rights enforceable under section 1983." 
Casey, 885 F.2d at 18. The issue in Casey , however, was 
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only whether the federal Medicaid statute, not its 
implementing regulations, created a federal right 
enforceable through section 1983. See id. at 17 ("The 
threshold issue in this case is whether [the plaintiff] can 
assert a cause of action against the defendant state officials 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for alleged violation of the federal 
medicaid statute."). Therefore, our broader statement was 
dicta not binding here. 
 
Plaintiffs place much reliance on Powell v. Ridge, 189 
F.3d at 403, in which we indicated that a disparate impact 
discrimination claim could be maintained under section 
1983 for a violation of a regulation promulgated pursuant 
to section 602. There, the plaintiffs brought a Title VI action 
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, challenging its 
practices in funding public education on the ground that 
they had a racially discriminatory effect. See id. at 391. On 
appeal, we considered, among other things, whether there 
was a private right of action available to enforce a 
regulation implementing Title VI, as well as whether a 
plaintiff can maintain a claim under section 1983 for a 
violation of that regulation. See id. We answered both 
questions in the affirmative, stating that section 602 and 
the Department of Education regulation at issue provided a 
private right of action, and that plaintiffs also could utilize 
section 1983 to redress defendants' alleged violation of the 
statute and regulation. See id. at 399-400, 403. 
 
Powell, however, should not be overread. Initially, it held 
that section 602 and the regulations under it included a 
private right of action. Moreover, in then authorizing the 
section 1983 action we merely rejected three specific 
arguments: (1) that the individual defendants were not 
"persons" amenable to suit under section 1983; 8 (2) that 
Title VI possessed a comprehensive enforcement scheme 
that precluded the assertion of the section 1983 claim; and 
(3) that our precedents barring certain claims under Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972 should have barred 
the action in Powell as well. See Powell , 189 F.3d at 400- 
03. But Powell did not analyze the foundation issue that is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. On appeal, the defendants did not advance this argument even though 
the district court had relied on it. See Powell , 189 F.3d at 401. 
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central here, i.e., whether a regulation in itself can create a 
right enforceable under section 1983. In Powell , we seemed 
simply to assume for section 1983 purposes that it could. 
See id. at 401 ("Once a plaintiff has identified a federal 
right that has allegedly been violated, there arises a 
`rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under 
S 1983.' "). Thus, while plaintiffs rely heavily on Powell, that 
reliance is misplaced, and, accordingly, quite aside from the 
impact of Sandoval, Powell could not control the outcome 
here.9 
 
Similarly, the district court's reliance on Buckley was 
misplaced. The issue there was whether the Federal Aid in 
Sport Fish Restoration Act and its interpretive regulations 
created an enforceable federal statutory right under section 
1983. See Buckley, 66 F.3d at 189-90. The court, after 
analyzing the relevant statutory and regulatory language, 
held that it did. See id. at 193. Inasmuch as the court 
stated expressly that it was determining whether the federal 
statute and its implementing regulations conferred a 
section 1983 right and not whether such a right arose 
under the implementing regulations alone, Buckley is 
distinguishable. See also Powell, 189 F.3d at 401; Farley v. 
Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 102 F.3d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1996) 
("[The] cause of action arises strictly under[the statutory 
provision.] Regulation S 966.57(b) merely interprets that 
section."); Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 867 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. It cannot be argued plausibly that by holding in Powell that there was 
a private right of action under Title VI, we necessarily determined that 
the plaintiffs in Powell had a right enforceable under section 1983. Even 
if it could be so argued, however, the aspect of the opinion holding that 
there is a private right of action under Title VI did not survive Sandoval 
and thus the 1983 claim would not survive either. In any event, the 
district court in South Camden II did not determine that the plaintiffs 
had a right enforceable under section 1983 merely because in Powell we 
had determined that there was a private right of action enforceable 
under Title VI. Rather, the court in South Camden II made an 
independent examination of whether a section 1983 action was available, 
just as we do. Indeed, it hardly could have avoided making that analysis 
as it cited favorably Santiago v. Hernandez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 264, 268 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999), for the point that "[i]t is conceptually possible for 
plaintiff who is the intended beneficiary of a statute to have a S 1983 
action but not a private right of action, or vice versa . . . ." 
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(D.C. Cir. 1996) (analyzing both statute and its 
accompanying regulations in determining whether 
enforceable section 1983 right existed); Tony L. v. Childers, 
71 F.3d 1182, 1189 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); City of Chicago 
v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir.1995) (same); Martinez 
v. Wilson, 32 F.3d 1415, 1421 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); 
Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(same), overruled by Blessing, 520 U.S. at 348, 117 S.Ct. at 
1363; Albiston v. Me. Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d 258, 
265 (1st Cir. 1993) (same), overruled by Blessing, 520 U.S. 
at 348, 117 S.Ct. at 1363; Pinnacle Nursing Home v. 
Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); 
Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 195 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (same). 
 
There are cases in other circuits addressing the question 
of whether a regulation alone may create a right enforceable 
under section 1983. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuits concluded that they may not and the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to the 
contrary. In Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 
1987), the court considered whether the state's use of an 
economic needs test on disabled persons requesting 
vocational rehabilitation services stated a cause of action 
under section 1983 for violations of the Social Security Act 
and its implementing regulations. After concluding that 
nothing in the statute created an entitlement to vocational 
rehabilitation services, the court addressed the plaintiff 's 
argument that the mandatory language utilized in the 
implementing regulations created such a right. See id. at 
984. The court rejected this claim, stating: 
 
       An administrative regulation . . . cannot create an 
       enforceable S 1983 interest not already implicit in the 
       enforcing statute. The Supreme Court has never held 
       that one could--to the contrary, members of the Court 
       have expressed doubt that `administrative regulations 
       alone could create such a right.' 
 
Id. (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 437, 107 S.Ct. at 777 
(O'Conner, J., dissenting)). Therefore, the court affirmed the 
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff 's section 1983 
cause of action. See id.; see also Former Special Project 
Employees Ass'n v. City of Norfolk, 909 F.2d 89, 94 (4th 
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Cir. 1990) (following Smith and concluding that "because 
[the statutory provision] does not provide an enforceable 
right, the [administrative regulation is] irrelevant to our 
consideration of the employee's claim under section 1983"). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion in Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th 
Cir. 1997). There, the court considered whether a Medicaid 
regulation requiring states to provide non-emergency 
transportation to and from providers created a right to such 
transportation enforceable under section 1983. See id. at 
996. The court began by reviewing the Supreme Court's 
precedent governing whether violations of federal statutes 
create section 1983 causes of action. See id.  at 997-1005. 
Then, the court turned to the specific question of whether 
the regulation created a federal right. See id.  at 1005. 
There, like here, the requirement plaintiffs sought to 
enforce "appear[ed] explicitly not in the Medicaid Act, but in 
a federal regulation," with the plaintiffs claiming that "the 
regulatory and statutory provisions create[d] a federal right 
to transportation to and from providers." Id.  The court 
rejected this argument. See id. at 1009-10. 
 
In doing so, it first acknowledged the relative dearth of 
authority on this precise issue, noting that courts of 
appeals are split and that the Supreme Court never 
definitively addressed the matter. See id. at 1005-07 (citing 
Wright, 479 U.S. at 437-38, 107 S.Ct. at 777-78 (O'Conner, 
J., dissenting); Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 638, 103 S.Ct. 
at 3251; Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 
(6th Cir. 1994); Smith, 821 F.2d at 984). The court then 
analyzed the majority opinion in Wright to ascertain 
whether it rejected the dissent's view of cases involving 
federal regulations, namely that administrative regulations 
alone cannot create enforceable federal rights, and found 
that it did not. See Harris v. James, 127 F.3d at 1007-08 
("We conclude that the Wright majority did not hold that 
federal rights are created either by regulations`alone' or by 
any valid administrative interpretation of a statute creating 
some enforceable right."). Therefore, the court rejected the 
argument that a " `federal right' [may be found] in any 
regulation that in its own right meets the three-prong 
`federal rights' test," as well as the argument that 
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"enforceable rights [may be found] in any valid 
administrative interpretation of a statute that creates some 
enforceable right." Id. at 1008. Instead, it adopted the rule 
that: 
 
       [S]o long as the statute itself confers a specific right 
       upon the plaintiff, and a valid regulation merely further 
       defines or fleshes out the content of that right, then the 
       statute--`in conjunction with the regulation'--may 
       create a federal right as further defined by the 
       regulation. 
 
       . . . 
 
        [But], if the regulation defines the content of a 
       statutory provision that creates no federal right under 
       the three-prong test, or if the regulation goes beyond 
       explicating the specific content of the statutory 
       provision and imposes distinct obligations in order to 
       further the broad objectives underlying the statutory 
       provision, we think the regulation is too far removed 
       from Congressional intent to constitute a `federal right' 
       enforceable under S 1983. To hold otherwise would be 
       inconsistent with the driving force of the Supreme 
       Court precedent requiring a Congressional intent to 
       create federal rights and with the Supreme Court's 
       directive that courts must find that Congress has 
       unambiguously conferred federal rights on the plaintiff. 
 
Id. at 1009 (footnotes omitted). 
 
Applying this rule, the court concluded that the 
regulation did not define the content of any specific right 
conferred upon the plaintiffs by statute because the"nexus 
between the regulation and Congressional intent to create 
federal rights [was] simply too tenuous to create an 
enforceable right to transportation." Id. at 1009-10. Finally, 
the court stated: 
 
       It may be that each of these statutes creates some 
       federal right; similarly, it may be that the 
       transportation regulation is a valid interpretation of 
       each of these provisions under Chevron. However, we 
       do not think these two factors, even if we found both 
       to be true, would add up to a federal right of 
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       transportation. In each case the transportation 
       regulation would be valid not because it reasonably 
       defines the content of rights created by the statutory 
       provisions, as did the regulation in Wright, but only 
       because the regulation furthers the broad objectives 
       underlying each statutory provision. . . . Instead, if the 
       regulation is a valid interpretation of these provisions, 
       it would be because transportation may be a 
       reasonable means of ensuring the prompt provision of 
       assistance, comparable assistance, or choice among 
       providers. Such links to Congressional intent may be 
       sufficient to support the validity of a regulation; 
       however, we think they are too tenuous to support a 
       conclusion that Congress has unambiguously 
       conferred upon Medicaid recipients a federal right to 
       transportation enforceable under S 1983. 
 
Id. at 1011-12 (footnote omitted); see Kissimmee River 
Valley Sportsman Ass'n v. City of Lakeland, 250 F.3d 1324, 
1327 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying Harris and concluding that 
"even more clearly . . . the instant regulation imposes new 
and `distinct obligations' not found in the statute itself, and 
thus is `too far removed from the Congressional intent to 
constitute a federal right enforceable under S 1983' "), cert. 
denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3106 (Nov. 26, 2001) (No. 01-204); Doe 
v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir. 1998) (utilizing 
Harris analysis and finding federal right was created by 
statute and regulations that "further define[d] the contours 
of the statutory right" at issue). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, 
reached the opposite result in Loschiavo. There, the court 
held that because administrative regulations have the force 
of law, they may create enforceable rights under section 
1983. See Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551 (citing Wright, 479 
U.S. at 431, 107 S.Ct. at 774). Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the regulation at issue created a federal 
right enforceable through section 1983. See id. at 552-53; 
see also Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(stating Loschiavo court held "plaintiffs may use Section 
1983 to enforce not only constitutional rights, but also 
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those rights defined by federal statutes [and federal 
regulations]").10 
 
Nevertheless, in light of the foregoing analysis, we reject 
the Loschiavo approach. To start with, we reiterate that in 
Sandoval the Court made the critical point that"[l]anguage 
in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that 
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not 
create a right that Congress has not." 532 U.S. at ___, 121 
S.Ct. at 1522. Furthermore, as we noted previously, the 
Court's focus in Wright was on tying Congress' intent to 
create federal rights through the statute to the particular 
federal right claimed. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 430, 107 
S.Ct. at 774; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09. It was of 
paramount importance that Congress intended to create 
such a right in the statute, with the regulation then 
defining the right that Congress already conferred through 
the statute. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 430 n.11 & 431, 107 
S.Ct. at 774 & n.11; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008. 
 
Moreover, it is apparent that in the Court's section 1983 
jurisprudence after Wright dealing with whether a plaintiff 
is advancing an enforceable right, the primary 
consideration has been to determine if Congress intended 
to create the particular federal right sought to be enforced. 
See Suter, 503 U.S. at 357, 112 S.Ct. at 1367 (stating issue 
as "[d]id Congress, in enacting the Adoption Act, 
unambiguously confer upon the child beneficiaries of the 
Act a right to enforce the requirement that the State make 
`reasonable efforts' to prevent a child from being removed 
from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with 
his family?"). Inasmuch as the Loschiavo court's approach 
first did not examine whether Congress intended to create 
the particular right at issue, we reject its holding that a 
federal right may be found in any federal regulation that, in 
its own right, meets the Blessing test. 
 
Therefore, we follow Wright, in accordance with its actual 
holding, the teaching of Sandoval, and the holdings in 
Harris and Smith, which we believe the courts of appeals 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Of course, when the issue was raised in a district court within the 
Sixth Circuit the court followed Loschiavo. See Lucero v. Detroit Public 
Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 781-85 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
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decided correctly, and hold that the EPA's disparate impact 
regulations cannot create a federal right enforceable 
through section 1983. To the extent, if any, that Powell 
might be thought on a superficial reading to suggest 
otherwise, in the light of Sandoval we cannot regard it as 
stating controlling law. Since the time of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Sandoval, it hardly can be argued 
reasonably that the right alleged to exist in the EPA's 
regulations, namely to be free of disparate impact 
discrimination in the administration of programs or 
activities receiving EPA assistance, can be located in either 
section 601 or section 602 of Title VI. 
 
In reaching our result, we emphasize the following. 
Sandoval made it clear that section 601 proscribes 
intentional discrimination only. See Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 
___, 121 S.Ct. at 1516. In discussing whether section 602 
and its implementing regulations created an implied right of 
action, the Court first considered whether Congress 
intended to create a federal right in favor of the plaintiffs.11 
See id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1520 21. After reviewing the 
relevant language of section 602, the Court stated: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. To adjudge whether an implied right of action exists under a 
particular statute, courts employ a four-factor test the Court first 
articulated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088 (1975). 
As the Court explained in Cannon: 
 
       In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute 
not 
       expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is 
the 
       plaintiff `one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute 
was 
       enacted,' that is, does that statute create a federal right in 
favor of 
       the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative 
intent, 
       explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? 
       Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the 
legislative 
       scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiffs? And finally, is 
the 
       cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an 
area 
       basically the concern of the States, so that it would be 
inappropriate 
       to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 
 
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688 n.9, 99 S.Ct. at 1953 n.9 (quoting Tex. & Pac. 
R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 482, 484 (1916)) (citations 
and emphasis omitted). Although not expressly, the Sandoval Court 
began, and ended, its analysis with the first factor, namely whether 
Congress intended to create a right in favor of the plaintiffs. See 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1520-21. 
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       It is immediately clear that the `rights-creating' 
       language so critical to the Court's analysis in Cannon 
       of S 601, is completely absent from S 602. Whereas 
       S 601 decrees that `[n]o person . . . shall . . . be 
       subjected to discrimination,' the text of S 602 provides 
       that `[e]ach Federal department and agency . . . is 
       authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of 
       [S 601].' Far from displaying congressional intent to 
       create new rights, S 602 limits agencies to 
       `effectuat[ing]' rights already created byS 601. And the 
       focus of S 602 is twice removed from the individuals 
       who will ultimately benefit from Title VI's protection. 
       Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather 
       than the individuals protected create `no implication of 
       an intent to confer rights on a particular class of 
       persons.' Section 602 is yet a step further removed: it 
       focuses neither on the individuals protected nor even 
       on the funding recipients being regulated, but on the 
       agencies that will do the regulating. . . . So far as we 
       can tell, this authorizing portion of S 602 reveals no 
       congressional intent to create a private right of action. 
 
        Nor do the methods that S 602 goes on to provide for 
       enforcing its authorized regulations manifest an intent 
       to create a private remedy; if anything, they suggest 
       the opposite. . . . Whatever these elaborate restrictions 
       on agency enforcement may imply for the private 
       enforcement of rights created outside ofS 602, they 
       tend to contradict a congressional intent to create 
       privately enforceable rights through S 602. 
 
Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1521 (citations omitted). Therefore, 
the Court found that there was no evidence of 
congressional intent to create new rights under section 602. 
See id. Rather, "S 602 limits agencies to`effectuat[ing]' 
rights already created by S 601."12 Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. It is important to note that relying upon the Sandoval Court's 
assessment of Congress' intent in enacting section 602, set forth in the 
context of determining whether there is a private right of action for the 
purposes of determining whether an enforceable right exists, does not, as 
the district court found, conflate the distinction between rights and 
remedies. See South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 517 ("The essence of 
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Inasmuch as the Court found previously that the only 
right conferred by section 601 was to be free of intentional 
discrimination, it does not follow that the right to be free 
from disparate impact discrimination can be located in 
section 602. In fact, it cannot. In sum, the regulations, 
though assumedly valid, are not based on any federal right 
present in the statute. Thus, this case is very similar to 
Smith and Harris. Here, as there, the regulations do more 
than define or flesh out the content of a specific right 
conferred upon the plaintiffs by Title VI. Instead, the 
regulations implement Title VI to give the statute a scope 
beyond that Congress contemplated, as Title VI does not 
establish a right to be free of disparate impact 
discrimination. Thus, the regulations are "too far removed 
from Congressional intent to constitute a `federal right' 
enforceable under S 1983." Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009. 
 
Accordingly, if there is to be a private enforceable right 
under Title VI to be free from disparate impact 
discrimination, Congress, and not an administrative agency 
or a court, must create this right. In this regard, we point 
out what should be obvious: the scope of conduct subject 
to being interdicted by limitations on actions having a 
disparate impact is far broader than limitations on 
intentional discrimination. Thus, we reiterate that if Title VI 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the NJDEP's and [St. Lawrence]'s misunderstanding of Sandoval lies in 
their conflation of rights with remedies in their analysis of the Supreme 
Court's holding in Sandoval."). It is true, as the district court 
repeatedly 
stated, that "[t]he holding in Sandoval  is explicitly limited to the 
determination that S 602 itself does not create a right of private 
action," 
or in other words, a remedy. Id. at 518. It is also true, as the Sandoval 
Court stated and the district court emphasized, that this court is "bound 
by holdings, not language." Sandoval, 532 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1517. 
That being said, we are not precluded from utilizing the Court's 
discussion of Congress' intent in enacting Title VI, although raised in 
the 
context of whether Congress intended a remedy  through section 602 
directly, to help it discern whether Congress intended to create a right 
that is enforceable through section 1983. Doing so respects the 
difference between the Cort implied-right-of-action analysis and the 
Blessing "rights" analysis because it relies upon the factor common to 
both. 
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is to go so far as to have the application that plaintiffs wish, 
Congress should take it there. 
 
We emphasize that the implications of this case are 
enormous and obviously, as the appearance of the many 
amici curiae attests, have not been lost on interested 
parties. It is plain that in view of the pervasiveness of state 
and local licensing provisions and the likely applicability of 
Title VI to the agencies involved, the district court's opinion 
has the potential, if followed elsewhere, to subject vast 
aspects of commercial activities to disparate impact 
analyses by the relevant agencies. Indeed, we noted in 
Powell that "[a]t least 40 federal agencies have adopted 
regulations that prohibit disparate-impact discrimination 
pursuant to [section 602]." Powell, 189 F.3d at 393. While 
we do not express an opinion on whether that would be 
desirable, we do suggest that if it is to happen, then 
Congress and not a court should say so as a court's 




We sum up our conclusions as follows. The Supreme 
Court's primary concern in considering enforceability of 
federal claims under section 1983 has been to ensure that 
Congress intended to create the federal right being 
advanced. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 357, 112 S.Ct. at 1367; 
Wright, 479 U.S. at 431, 107 S.Ct. at 774. Accordingly, we 
hold that a federal regulation alone may not create a right 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. St. Lawrence and NJDEP raise numerous other procedural and 
substantive arguments in support of their appeals. In view of our result, 
with one exception, we do not address them as the appeal is only from 
the granting of preliminary injunction that we are reversing on other 
grounds. Nevertheless, it is possible that on further proceedings the 
issues involved in those arguments may be significant and thus we want 
to make it clear that we are taking no position on those points. The one 
exception is NJDEP's argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars this 
action to the extent that it "prohibits the retrospective revocation of 
[St. 
Lawrence's] air permit." Br. at 44. We are constrained to consider this 
argument as it is jurisdictional. See Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. and 
Econ. 
Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2000). After careful consideration, we 
have concluded that the argument is without merit, and we therefore 
reject it without discussion. 
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enforceable through section 1983 not already found in the 
enforcing statute. Similarly, we reject the argument that 
enforceable rights may be found in any valid administrative 
implementation of a statute that in itself creates some 
enforceable right. Applying these rules here, it is clear that, 
particularly in light of Sandoval, Congress did not intend by 
adoption of Title VI to create a federal right to be free from 
disparate impact discrimination and that while the EPA's 
regulations on the point may be valid, they nevertheless do 
not create rights enforceable under section 1983. The 
district court erred as a matter of law in concluding 
otherwise and therefore also erred in finding that plaintiffs 
are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. 
Consequently, we will reverse the district court's order of 
May 10, 2001, granting preliminary injunctive relief and 
will remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
Plaintiffs seek to enforce regulations promulgated under 
S 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000-1. The validity of those regulations is not in dispute 
here. The regulations are set forth at 40 C.F.R.S 7.10 et 
seq. and require the defendants to consider the potentially 
adverse disparate impact of air permits that St. Lawrence 
needs to operate the proposed facility.1  
 
The majority's decision to reverse the district court's 
grant of preliminary injunctive relief is based upon my 
colleagues' conclusion that the district court erred"as a 
matter of law . . . in finding that plaintiffs are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their claim." Maj. Op. at 37. 
However, our review here ought to be limited to determining 
if plaintiffs have established "a reasonable probability of 
succeeding on the merits. . . ." ACLU v. Reno , 217 F.3d 
162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). We need look no 
further than our recent decision in Powell v. Ridge, (3d Cir.) 
cert denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999) to find the answer to that 
question. The majority correctly notes that the Supreme 
Court's subsequent decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 
U.S. 1049 (2001), overruled part of our holding in Powell. 
However, Powell was not overruled in its entirety until 
today. Ironically, the majority overrules Powell by engaging 
in an analysis that overreads Sandoval while cautioning 
that "Powell, . . . should not be overread." Maj. Op. at 26. 





Before beginning my discussion I think it is important to 
define the parameters of our inquiry. First, "we must affirm 
unless we find the [district] court abused its discretion, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The extent to which plaintiffs have already suffered a disparate impact 
of pollution is readily apparent from the factual summary set forth by 
the majority. See Maj. Op. at 10 ("As a result, Waterfront South, though 
only one of 23 Camden neighborhoods, hosts 20% of the city's 
contaminated sites and, on average, has more than twice the number of 
facilities with permits to emit air pollution than exist in the area 
encompassed within a typical New Jersey zip code."). 
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committed an obvious error of law, or made a serious 
mistake in considering proof." Bill Blass, Ltd v. SAZ Corp, et 
al, 751 F.2d 152, 154 (3rd Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). 
Our analysis is not driven by factual issues. Accordingly, 
our inquiry turns on whether the district court committed 
an "obvious error of law." If it committed such an error, it 
abused its discretion in granting preliminary relief. If it did 
not commit such an error, preliminary relief was 
appropriate, and we must affirm. Second, there is no issue 
about the validity of the applicable regulations enacted 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 602. The majority assumes they 
are valid, just as the Supreme Court did in Sandoval. Third, 
 
       it has long been the rule in this Circuit that decisions 
       made in similar cases by panels of this Court are 
       binding on other panels . . . . [i]t is only through the 
       Court En Banc that precedents established by earlier 
       [published] panel decisions may be reexamined. 
 
In the Matter of The Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 485 
F.2d 208, 210 (3rd Cir. 1974). See also Reich v. D.M. Sabia 
Co., 90 F.3d 854 (3rd Cir. 1996). 
 
The majority concludes that the plaintiffs' action here is 
"legally insufficient" and that the district court therefore 
erred in granting preliminary injunctive relief, Maj. Op. at 
14, because the disparate impact regulations plaintiffs seek 
to enforce are "too far removed from Congressional intent to 
constitute a `federal right' enforceable underS 1983." Id. at 
35. Based upon that analysis, the majority concludes that 
plaintiffs have no reasonable probability of success on the 
merits and are therefore not entitled to injunctive relief. 





42 U.S.C. S 1983 provides: 
 
       Every person who, under color of any statute, 
       ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
       or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
       causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
       or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
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       deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
       secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
       the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or 
       other proper proceeding for redress. 
 
Section 601 of Title VI provides: 
 
       No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
       of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
       participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
       subjected to discrimination under any program or 
       activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000d. The Supreme Court has held that S 601 
only reaches intentional discrimination. See Sandoval, 121 
S. Ct. at 1516. However, S 602 authorizes federal regulatory 
agencies to promulgate regulations under Title VI. 
 
Section 602 provides, in relevant part: 
 
       Each Federal department and agency which is 
       empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to 
       any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or 
       contract other than a contract of insurance or 
       guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the 
       provisions of section 2000d [Section 601] of this title 
       with respect to such program or activity by issuing 
       rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability 
       which shall be consistent with achievement of the 
       objectives of the statute authorizing financial 
       assistance in connection with which the action is 
       taken. 
 
Id. S 2000d-1. The regulations at issue here were 
promulgated under S 602 and they proscribe discrimination 
that results from the disparate impact of certain activity. 
The Environmental Protection Agency is not alone in 
promulgating disparate-impact regulations underS 602. In 
Powell we noted that "[a]t least 40 federal agencies have 
adopted regulations that prohibit disparate-impact 
discrimination pursuant to this authority." 189 F.3d at 
393. 
 
We held in Powell, that the plaintiffs there could 
maintain an action under S 1983 to enforce disparate 
impact regulations promulgated under S 602 by the 
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Department of Education that are virtually identical to the 
regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection 
Agency that are at issue here.2 Plaintiffs in Powell brought 
an action against state officials challenging the funding 
mechanism for public education. They alleged, inter alia, 
that the defendants' method of funding education in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had a racially 
discriminatory impact in violation of Title VI and its 
implementing regulations. 
 
The district court dismissed the complaint based upon its 
conclusion that the plaintiffs did not "adequately allege that 
a specific element of the Commonwealth's funding practices 
adversely and disproportionately affects students of a 
particular race." 189 F.3d at 393. On appeal, the 
defendants asserted an alternative ground for upholding 
the district court. They argued that the Title VI regulations 
did not provide an enforceable right. We resolved that 
inquiry by applying the four prong test established in Cort 
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and a similar inquiry set forth 
in Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. 764 F.2d 
939 (3d Cir. 1985). See Powell. 189 F.3d at 397 ("It is by 
now well established that implication of a private right of 
action for a statute requires analysis of the factors set forth 
in Cort v. Ash."). We concluded that Title VI afforded 
plaintiffs a right to enforce the prohibition against disparate 
impact discrimination contained in the regulations 
promulgated pursuant to S 602 of Title VI. We stated: 
 
       The regulation at issue here, although promulgated by 
       the Department of Education under 602 of Title VI, 
       implements S 601 of Title VI. The Supreme Court 
       precedent and our cases firmly establish that S 601 of 
       Title VI gives rise to an implied right of action, at least 
       for our purposes for securing injunctive relief. 
 
189 F.3d at 399. We also concluded that the remaining 
prongs of the relevant inquiry were satisfied and held that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The regulation at issue in Powell was codified at 34 C.F.R. 
S 100.3(b)(2) and it prohibited recipients of applicable federal funds 
from 
"utilizing criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, 
. . . ." 189 F.3d at 393. 
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plaintiffs had therefore established "an implied private right 
of action to enforce the regulations promulgated under 602 
of Title VI." Id. There is no question that that portion of our 
holding can not stand after the Supreme Court's 
pronouncement in Sandoval. That was the precise issue 
addressed in Sandoval and Powell was rendered a dead 
letter as to that issue. However, that was also the only 
issue decided in Sandoval. The Court's holding did not 
address Count II of the complaint that was before the court 
in Powell. 
 
In Powell, we explained: "[p]laintiffs' second count 
invokes one of the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C.S 1983 to 
address the defendants' alleged violation of the regulation." 
Id. We concluded that inasmuch as the complaint sought 
only injunctive and declaratory relief defendants were 
"persons acting under color of state law" under S 1983. Id. 
at 401. We then cited Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 
(1997) in stating that "once a plaintiff has identified a 
federal right that has allegedly been violated, there arises a 
rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under 
S 1983.' " 189 F.3d at 401. Inasmuch as the relevant 
statute did not explicitly foreclose a suit underS 1983, and 
since that statute clearly lacked a "comprehensive 
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual 
enforcement under S 1983," we concluded that plaintiffs 
could maintain an action to enforce the provisions of the 
regulations promulgated under S 602 by resorting to 
S 1983. We stated simply, "we see no reason to hold that 
resort to S 1983 has been foreclosed here." Id. at 402. 
 
The majority seizes upon that articulation of our holding 
to minimize the effect of what we said. My colleagues state: 
"Powell did not analyze the foundation issue that is central 
here, i.e. whether a regulation in itself can create a right 
enforceable under section S 1983. In Powell we seemed 
simply to assume for section 1983 purposes that it could." 
Maj. Op. at 26-27. My colleagues then cite to Powell at 401 
and note that we there stated, "Once a plaintiff has 
identified a federal right that has allegedly been violated, 
there arises a `rebuttable presumption that the right is 
enforceable under S 1983." Maj. Op. 27. I am frankly 
astounded by that analytical alchemy. The rebuttable 
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presumption we referred to in Powell arises not because we 
"assumed" a cause of action under S 1983, but precisely 
because we held there was a cause of action under S 1983. 
See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 1359. In Blessing , the Court was 
asked to determine if a plaintiff could enforce a right under 
S 1983. That was the issue, and it was the only issue. The 
Court stated, "We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement 
among the Courts of Appeals as to whether individuals may 
sue state officials under S 1983 for violations of Title IV-D." 
Id. at 339-40. The Court began that inquiry by citing Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), wherein the Court had held 
that S 1983 provided a remedy for violations of federal 
rights, not federal laws. The Blessing Court could not have 
been clearer in stating: "[i]n order to seek redress through 
S 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a 
federal right, not merely a violation of federal law." Blessing, 
520 U.S. at 340 (emphasis in original). The Court then 
applied the three factor test set forth in Wright v. Roanoke 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987), 
to determine if plaintiff had established a federal right. In 
doing so, the Court noted that if plaintiff had established 
such a right, it would be enforceable under S 1983 unless 
Congress had foreclosed resort to S 1983 either in the text 
of the applicable statute, or the comprehensive nature of 
the relevant statutory scheme. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. It 
is in this latter context that a presumption arises. 
Accordingly, there is a presumption that S 1983 is available 
once a federal right (as opposed to a violation of federal law) 
is established. The presumption is rebutted if a defendant 
can establish that Congress expressed its intent (explicitly, 
or implicitly through the statutory scheme), that the statute 
not be enforceable under the general rubric of S 1983. 
 
It is true, as the majority notes, that much of our 
discussion in Powell was worded in terms of refuting 
defendant's assertion that plaintiffs could maintain a cause 
of action. The majority notes: that "[Powell ] merely rejected 
. . . specific arguments. But Powell did not analyze the 
foundation issue that is central here, i.e. whether a 
regulation in itself can create a right enforceable under 
section 1983." Maj. Op. at 26-27. That assertion can not 
withstand even a cursory reading of Powell. The fact that 
we "merely rejected" defendant's arguments that S 1983 
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does not allow a private cause of action to enforce the 
regulations does not negate the fact that the result of 
refuting those arguments was that we found plaintiffs had 
a cause of action under S 1983, and that was part of our 
holding. The majority's attempt to suggest the contrary is 
tantamount to arguing that "merely rejecting" the argument 
that 2 plus 2 does not equal 4 does not at the same time 
establish that 2 plus 2 does equal 4. 
 
The sleight of hand that transforms our mention of a 
"presumption" in Powell into an assumption about the 
application of S 1983 is even more puzzling when one 
considers that the majority's own analysis states that the 
relevant presumption does not arise unless the plaintiff can 
establish a federal right has been violated. My colleagues 
quite correctly state: "If a plaintiff . . . establishes and 
identifies a federal right that allegedly has been violated, a 
rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable 
through section 1983 arises." Maj. Op. at 18 (citing 
Blessing). Therefore, the majority clearly recognizes that 
Powell concluded that the plaintiffs there had a federal 
right, arising from the regulations promulgated under Title 
VI, and that the right could be enforced under S 1983 
absent a demonstration that the cause of action was 
precluded by the text of Title VI, or the statutory scheme. 
We held that the defendants in Powell could not rebut the 
presumption. Moreover, the majority here correctly 
concedes that that was part of our holding in Powell, even 
while attempting to transform the holding into a mere 
assumption. See Maj. Op. at 13 ("In reaching its result the 
[district] court relied, inter alia on Powell v. Ridge, in which 
we held that there was a private right of action available to 
enforce a regulation implementing Title VI and  that a 
disparate impact discrimination claim could be maintained 
under section 1983 for a violation of a regulation 
promulgated pursuant to section 602.") (emphasis added); 
see also Maj. Op. at 26 ("We answered both questions in 
the affirmative, stating that section 602 and the 
Department of Education regulation at issue provided a 
private right of action, and that plaintiffs could utilize 
section 1983 to redress defendant's alleged violation of the 
statute and regulation.") (emphasis added). As noted above, 
it is clear that the first part of our holding in Powell does 
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not survive Sandoval. However, that is simply not true of 
the second part of the holding. Sandoval never discussed 
the S 1983 issue. 
 
In Sandoval, plaintiffs brought a class action against the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety in an attempt to 
enjoin the Department from administering drivers license 
examinations only in English. Plaintiffs alleged that 
administering the test in English to Spanish speaking 
residents had the effect of discriminating against them in 
violation of S 601 of Title VI. The Court began its analysis 
by stating that it was clear from the Court's own decisions, 
Congress' amendments to Title VI, "and from the parties' 
concessions that three aspects of Title VI must be taken as 
given." 121 Sup. Ct. at 1516. These were that private 
individuals could sue to enforce the prohibition of 
intentional discrimination contained in S 601, that S 601 
prohibits only intentional discrimination, and "we must 
assume for purposes of deciding this case that regulations 
promulgated under S 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe 
activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, 
even though such activities are permissible underS 601." 
Id. at 1516-17. 
 
In writing for the majority and noting these three 
principles were taken as given, Justice Scalia observed that 
five justices of the Court had previously, in Guardians 
Association v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City , 463 
U.S. 582 (1983), voiced that latter principle "at least as 
alternative grounds for their decisions." Sandoval 121 S.Ct 
at 1517. Justice Scalia noted that that position was"in 
considerable tension with the rule of Bakke3 and Guardians 
that S 601 forbids only intentional discrimination. . . ." Id. 
However, inasmuch as the plaintiffs in Sandoval  had not 
challenged the regulations and had asserted a claim only 
under S 601, the Court, "for the purposes of deciding this 
case" assumed that the regulations proscribing disparate 
impact discrimination "are valid." Id. at 1517. 
 
The question before the Court was, therefore, a very 
narrow one. The only issue was whether S 602 created a 
free standing private cause of action to enforce regulations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Referring to Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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precluding disparate impact discrimination. As noted 
above, that was the only question that the Court granted 
certiorari to review. The Court answered that narrow 
inquiry as follows: 
 
       "neither as originally enacted nor as later amended 
       does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding 
       proper right of action to enforce regulations 
       promulgated under S 602. We therefore hold that no 
       such right of action exists." 
 
121 Sup. Ct. at 1523. 
 
The majority seizes upon the "language of Sandoval," to 
answer the very different inquiry posed by the district 
court's injunction here. The majority does so even while 
noting that the Court in Sandoval cautioned that "this 
Court is `bound by holdings, not language.' " Maj. Op. at 35 
n. 12 (quoting Sandoval 121 Sup. Ct. at 1517). The 
language of Sandoval, however, can not read an issue into 
that case that was not raised by the parties and not 
decided by the Court. 
 
The issue here, simply stated, is whether S 1983 provides 
an independent avenue to enforce disparate impact 
regulations promulgated under S 602 of Title VI. That is the 
same question that was posed in Powell. We answered it in 
the affirmative in Powell, and the answer was not 
overturned by the subsequent holding in Sandoval. Powell 
therefore controls our inquiry here until overruled by the 
Supreme Court, or this court sitting en banc. See Central 
Railroad, 485 F.2d at 210. Clearly, the majority's decision 
is not based on any determination of the en banc court. 
Just as clearly, it is not based upon the holding in 
Sandoval, or Powell. 
 
The majority reasons that inasmuch as the Sandoval 
majority did not find the requisite Congressional intent for 
a private cause of action in the statute there can be no 
enforceable right under S 1983. See Maj. Op. at 37 
("Applying these rules here, it is clear that, particularly in 
light of Sandoval, Congress did not intend by adoption of 
Title VI to create a federal right to be free from disparate 
impact discrimination and that while the EPA's regulations 
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on the point may be valid, they nevertheless do not create 




       This [an enforceable right under S 1983] is a different 
       inquiry than that involved in determining whether a 
       private right of action can be implied in a particular 
       statute. In right of action cases we employ the four- 
       factor Cort test to determine whether Congress 
       intended to create the private remedy asserted for the 
       violation of statutory rights. The test reflects a concern, 
       grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather 
       than the courts controls the availability of remedies for 
       violations of statutes. Because S 1983 provides an 
       alternative source of express congressional authorization 
       of private suits, these separation-of-powers concerns are 
       not present in a S 1983 case. Consistent with this view, 
       we recognize an exception to the general rule that 
       S 1983 provides a remedy for violation of federal 
       statutory rights only when Congress has affirmatively 
       withdrawn the remedy. 
 
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assoc., 496 U.S. at 508 n.9 
(1990) (emphasis added) (internal citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Sea Clammers , 453 U.S. at 
19.). 
 
The majority in Sandoval did, in fact, apply the 
aforementioned Cort test for determining if a cause of action 
existed in the statute. The Court did not apply the 
Blessing test that is used under S 1983 analysis.4 This fact 
alone should cause my colleagues pause before 
"overreading" Sandoval. 
 
Moreover, if we are to discount Powell on the grounds 
that Powell only assumed plaintiffs there had an actionable 
S 1983 claim so too we must distinguish Sandoval--a case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Blessing requires, as its first element, that "Congress must have 
intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff." Blessing, 
520 U.S. at 340. The Sandoval Court, on the other hand, asked in its 
private right of action inquiry, "whether it[section 602] displays an 
intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy." 
Sandoval, 121 S.Ct. at 1519. 
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which is even one step more removed than Powell  from the 
appropriate inquiry--as Sandoval did not even address 
S 1983 to begin with. 
 
Although my colleagues recognize in a footnote that the 
four justices who dissented in Sandoval believed that 
litigants could still bring a S 1983 cause of action for 
violation of a Title VI disparate-impact regulation, the 
majority fails to give that fact the significance it deserves. 
See Maj. Op. at 17 n.5. The dissenting justices responded 
to the majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs in Sandoval 
could not bring a cause of action under Title VI by stating: 
 
       to the extent that the majority denies relief to the 
       respondents merely because they neglected to mention 
       42 U.S.C. S 1983 and framing their Title VI claim, this 
       case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the 
       future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against 
       state actors in all likelihood must only referenceS 1983 
       to obtain relief; indeed, the plaintiffs in this case . . . 
       presumably retain the option of rechallenging 
       Alabama's English-only policy in a complaint that 
       invokes S 1983 even after today's decision. 
 
Sandoval at 1527. 
 
In reaching our second holding in Powell, we also noted 
that 
 
       Defendants' argument conflicts with the Supreme 
       Court's own pronouncements. As previously noted, in  
       Guardians five of the nine justices agreed that 
       the administrative regulations incorporating a 
       disparate impact standard are valid, see 463 U.S. at 
       584 n. 2, 607 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 3221, and thereafter the 
       Court in Alexander5 characterized Guardians as so 
       holding. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293, 105 S.Ct. 712 
       ("[Guardians] held that actions having an unjustifiable 
       disparate impact on minorities could be redressed 
       through agency regulations designed to implement the 
       purposes of Title VI."). Obviously, the Supreme Court 
       did not believe that administrative regulations that 
       prohibit disparate impact were an impermissible 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Referring to Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
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       creation of substantive law, even though in its own 
       earlier opinion in Guardians the Supreme Court had 
       held that Title VI itself did not extend that far. 
 
189 F.3d at 399-400. 
 
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent affords additional 
support for the plaintiffs' claim here. In Wright v. City of 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., supra , the plaintiffs 
brought an action under S 1983 to enforce regulations that 
defined "rent" under the relevant statute. Defendants 
argued that the rights plaintiffs sought to enforce under 
S 1983 were too amorphous and vague to confer an 
enforceable right under S 1983. In rejecting that argument 
the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[t]he regulations . . . 
have the force of law." 479 U.S. at 431. 
 
The majority attempts to distance the instant inquiry 
from the analysis in Wright by arguing that the Court there 
first examined the relevant statute and concluded that the 
statute, itself, conferred the right plaintiffs were seeking to 
enforce under S 1983. Only upon making that 
determination, argues the majority, did the Court then 
conclude that the relevant regulations could properly define 
and flesh out the statutorily conferred right. The majority 
then concludes that, inasmuch as the relevant right here 
resides in the regulations, not Title VI, S 1983 can not 
independently afford the relief that Congress did not 
provide for in the controlling statute. Maj. Op. at 24. 
 
It is true that the Court in Wright ordered its analysis as 
the majority suggests. However, the Court stated that the 
regulation had the force of law as part of its Blessing 
analysis. Significantly, the Court applied that analysis not 
to the provisions of the statute, but to the regulation itself. 
Accordingly, Wright is consistent with, and supports, the 
plaintiffs' position here that the regulations themselves may 
give birth to a federal right so long as the regulations are 
valid. 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court later interpreted Wright 
as finding an enforceable right in the interrelationship 
between the regulations and underlying statute. See Wilder, 
496 U.S. at 511 ("[I]n Wright, we found that the [statute] 
. . . and its implementing regulations did create rights 
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enforceable under S 1983."). Cases that we decided before 
Powell reached the same conclusion. See Alexander v. Polk, 
750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
In Polk, we concluded that the regulation at issue created 
an enforceable right. See Polk, 750 F.2d at 259 ("It is clear 
that 7 C.F.R. S 246.24 created an enforceable right on 
behalf of [plaintiffs] to be informed of the availability of fair 
hearings."). The majority attempts to reconcile today's 
opinion with Polk by stating that the right identified there 
could be "traced to and was consistent with the statute". 
Maj. op. at 25. We ought not dismiss Polk so easily 
however, given our pronouncement in Powell. Although we 
did not cite Polk in Powell, we were clearly aware of the Polk 
analysis, and it is consistent with our result in Powell. 
Furthermore, although Polk was decided before Blessing, it 
is clear that the analysis in Polk is consistent with a 
Blessing analysis, and the focus upon congressional intent. 
See Polk, 750 F.2d at 259 ("The provision was intended to 
safeguard the legal rights of WIC beneficiaries by informing 
them of fair hearing procedures."). 
 
The regulations the South Camden plaintiffs are 
attempting to enforce can also be traced to Title VI. The 
majority focuses on the fact that S 601 proscribes only 
intentional discrimination. Nevertheless, disparate-impact 
regulations may very well reflect an agency's practical 
considerations and definition of discrimination, just as 
"rent" was defined by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development in the regulations in Wright . We cannot 
invalidate that regulatory definition without invalidating the 
regulations, and the majority claims that it is not doing that.6 
 
Lastly, in keeping with the tendency to rely upon 
"language" that is favorable, and distinguish contrary 
pronouncements as "dicta," the majority dismisses our 
decision in West Virginia Univ. Hospitals v. Casey, 885 F.2d 
11 (3rd Cir. 1989) as "dicta." Maj. op. at 26. In Casey, we 
interpreted Wright and Polk as standing for the proposition 
that regulations, as well as statutes, can create rights that 
are enforceable under S 1983. There we stated,"valid 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although the majority snipes at the disparate-impact regulations, my 
colleagues concede they are valid for purposes of the instant analysis. 
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federal regulations as well as federal statutes may create 
rights enforceable under section 1983," and we cited 
Wright, and Polk. 885 F.2d at 18. I readily concede that 
Casey involved only a statute, not regulations, and 
therefore, this statement was "dicta" just as the majority 
states. However, I think it noteworthy that my colleagues so 
readily dismiss statements from our own jurisprudence as 
"dicta" while relying upon dicta  from cases that support its 
analysis and identifying the "dicta" as "teachings." See Maj. 
Op. at 32-33 ("we follow Wright, in accordance with its 
actual holding, the teaching of Sandoval, and the holdings 
in Harris and Smith, which we believe the courts of appeals 
decided correctly"). 
 
Of course, whether or not the plaintiffs would ultimately 
prevail on the merits is not the issue before us today. 
However, given controlling precedent in Powell  I frankly fail 
to see how we can conclude that their chances of prevailing 
are anything less than reasonable. Moreover, their position 
has been adopted by our sister Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit. See Loschiavo v. City of Dearborne, 33 F.3d 
548 (6th Cir. 1994), (holding that regulations promulgated 
under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
created a right which plaintiff could enforce under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, and relying upon Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 
and Wright, 479 U.S. at 432). The reasonableness of the 
plaintiffs' position is further underscored by the four 
dissenting justices in Sandoval. They noted: 
 
       the majority declines to accord precedential value to 
       Guardians because the five justices in the majority 
       were arguably divided over the mechanism for which 
       private parties might seek such injunctive relief. 
 




Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, I 
respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority. I do 
readily concede that, given the pronouncements in 
Sandoval, the majority's opinion here has some force. 
However, the majority's opinion can not withstand scrutiny 
given Powell, as well as other cases that were not overruled 
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by Sandoval. I believe that the district court was clearly 
correct in concluding that plaintiffs can demonstrate a 
"reasonable probability of success" on the merits.7 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




7. Inasmuch as the majority's analysis is limited to the first prong of 
the 
four part test for upholding a preliminary injunction I have not 
discussed whether plaintiffs have shown that they will be irreparably 
harmed by the denial of relief, whether granting the preliminary relief 
will result in even greater harm to the defendants or whether granting 
preliminary relief will be in the public interest. See Allegheny Energy 
Inc. 
v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) citing ACLU v. Blackhorse 
Pike Regional Bd. Of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc)). 
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